With the advent of the Internet, we have seen existing markets transform and new ones emerge. In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon by developing a unified theory about the role that IT plays in affecting market information, transparency and market structure. In particular, we introduce a new theoretical framework which uncovers the process and the forces that, together with IT, facilitate or inhibit the emerging dominance of transparent electronic markets. Transparent electronic markets offer unbiased, complete, and accurate market information. Our effort to develop a unified theoretical framework begins with a thorough assessment of the prior literature. It also uses an inductive approach involving the case study method, in which we contrast and compare the forces that have led the air travel and financial securities markets to become increasingly transparent. Building on the electronic markets and electronic hierarchies research of Malone, Yates and Benjamin [1987], our findings suggest that IT alone does not explain a move to transparent electronic markets. Instead, we argue that enhanced electronic representation of products, and competitive and institutional forces have also played an important role in the process by which most sellers have come to favor transparent markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electronic markets hypothesis (EMH) posits that IT reduces coordination costs between suppliers and buyers, leading to the dominance of market-based forms of economic activity [Malone et al., 1987] . The primary drivers of this move are advanced ITs such as the Internet, which provide a platform that reduces information search costs. The EMH predicts that, in this technological environment, biased electronic markets will emerge as suppliers take advantage of IT to lock in buyers. However, unbiased electronic markets will gradually dominate, where all products and suppliers can be evaluated by buyers to make well-informed decisions.
Unbiased markets generally benefit buyers because they are better able to discern the product that best fits their needs. On the other hand, this very benefit to buyers may be a threat to sellers, as they forego the benefits of information asymmetries. Consequently, some industries which were expected to move to unbiased electronic markets have not done so. Possible explanations include the move-to-the-middle hypothesis [Clemons et al., 1993] and the riskaugmented transaction cost theory [Kauffman and Mohtadi, 2004] , which uncover the incentives of market participants to implement biases. Nevertheless, many firms deliberately compete for buyers with market information.
So far, theories of the impact of IT on market structure explain rather specific outcomes. At one extreme, there are theories such as the EMH that predict a move to unbiased electronic markets. On the other hand, there are theories that explain why biased markets and other quasi-market forms may prevail. However, both outcomes are observed in the real world, and it appears that the strategic choices of firms can affect these outcomes. For example, although many online travel agencies have embraced the Internet to offer products and prices from most airlines [Granados et al., 2005] , a similar move which would be expected in the mortgage industry has not occurred-at least not to the same extent [Hess and Kemerer, 1994] . With the advent of the Internet, the long-term outcome of the mortgage industry's structure is still uncertain, and it will depend on technical implementation choices of firms in the industry [Wigand et al., 2005] .
Our objective is to examine the variations in market outcomes as firms use IT to compete for consumers with market information and provide theoretical explanations for these variations. We start by integrating existing arguments from different theories about why specific market outcomes may prevail. In particular, we use Malone et al.'s [1987] and other authors' numerous arguments about the conditions under which unbiased electronic markets are preferred to biased electronic markets. 1 However, we also use arguments from theories that explain why biased markets may prevail. In other words, while we use existing theory on hierarchies and markets as a theoretical foundation, we focus on the different dimensions of market transformation triggered by IT, once market-based forms are in place.
In addition, we observe that firms have used IT to devise complex strategies to manipulate information that affect more than just the level of bias of their market mechanisms. A more complete characterization of the possible strategies is related to the concept of market transparency, which includes the accuracy and completeness of market information, in addition to the level of bias.
Therefore, there is an opportunity to extend the theoretical foundations of the impact of IT on market structure, based on real-world observations from recent years, as the evolution of electronic markets is fueled by the Internet.
In this paper, we examine how IT interacts with other forces to facilitate or inhibit a move to transparent electronic markets, and set the stage for future research on other forms of advanced market organization. We use a case research strategy, which is appropriate to answer "how" questions [Benbasat et al., 1987] and uncover process knowledge. In particular, we build theory to answer the following research questions:
• To what extent do we observe a move to transparent markets in different sectors?
• What are the factors and theoretical bases that explain differences in market structure in the presence of IT?
To answer these questions, we leverage the theory of market design [Spulber, 1999] , which studies the design of market mechanisms that enable trade. This theory provides new perspectives on the possible outcomes of market organization, beyond just the level of bias. We categorize the market design choices that firms make in terms of informational features and the degree of automation, and use this expanded set of market design dimensions to analyze the IT-driven transformation in the air travel and financial securities markets.
Then, consistent with case study methodologies for theory development [Eisenhardt, 1989] , we perform a cross-case analysis to develop testable propositions regarding the impact of IT on market structure. Due to the information-intensive nature of these industries, our analysis emphasizes impacts of IT on informational features of markets. However, further theoretical development to explore IT and market structure is appropriate in other dimensions.
We next present two theories-the theory of electronic markets and electronic hierarchies, and the theory of market design, as bases for construction of a unified theoretical framework for market transparency. In the third section, we analyze the market structure transformation of the United States financial securities markets and the air travel industry. In the fourth section, we perform a cross-case analysis to derive a theoretical framework of the impact of IT on market transparency. We conclude with a discussion and preliminary evaluation of our theoretical contribution and note some related opportunities for future research.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We define an electronic market as a system that allows market participants to exchange information about prices and product offerings electronically. In this article, IT refers to technological artifacts that enable electronic markets, such as Internet, network technologies, and communication technologies. We next describe two theories which provide building blocks to formulate an explanation of how IT shapes a market's structure: electronic markets and hierarchies theory and market design theory.
ELECTRONIC MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES
Theories about the impact of IT on organizational forms are rooted in transaction cost economics. Coase [1937] , in his discussion of the boundary of the firm, suggested that the flow of materials will occur within a firm to the extent that the respective transaction costs are lower than in the price mechanisms of markets. More generally, firms (or hierarchies) and markets are two polar forms of economic activity, while contractual arrangements between firms fall along a continuum from firms to markets, such as electronic integration, long-term contracts, and joint ventures [Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1994] .
Building on transaction cost economics, the electronic market hypothesis (EMH) of Malone et al. [1987] predicts that IT will lead to higher use of market transactions in the conduct of economic activity. IT reduces market coordination costs, such as the cost of searching for suppliers, establishing contracts, and buying supplies in the spot market. The EMH also predicts that moves to market-based forms of organization will be gradual; they will not occur all at once. Malone et al. [1987] state that the first stage will involve movement from electronic hierarchies to biased electronic markets. In this stage, suppliers benefit from implementing systems that conceal or distort information about competitors. In the second stage, competitive and legal forces lead to the adoption of unbiased electronic markets, where all options for trading are made available. Finally, in the third stage, the proliferation of information in unbiased markets leads to personalized markets, with functionality that allows buyers to filter the options available for trading. In this manner, Malone et al. [1987] and other researchers identified the potential impact that IT can have on the informational structure of markets.
It is fair to say that the overall predictions of Malone et al.'s [1987] work were remarkably on target in some industries. One example that especially rings true is the air travel industry, which involves their predictions about unbiased and personalized markets.
"In these cases, a final stage may be the development of electronic markets that provide personalized decision aids to help individual buyers select from the alternatives available, what we call personalized markets bold added for emphasis]. For example, at least one such system has been developed for airline reservations … Using this system, travel agencies and corporate travel departments can receive information about available flights with each flight automatically ranked on a scale from 1 to 100. The rankings take into account 'fares, departure times, and even the value of an executive's time.' … It is easy to imagine even more sophisticated systems that use artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to screen advertising messages and product descriptions according to precisely the criteria that are important to a given buyer … Air travelers, for instance, might specify rules with which their own automated buyers' agents [bold again added for emphasis] could compare a wide range of possible flights and select the ones that best match that particular traveler's preferences. A fairly simple set of such rules could, in many cases, do a better job of matching travelers' preferences than all but the most conscientious and knowledgeable travel agents. [pp. 492-493] Despite these theoretical predictions, real world observations point out that IT innovations have not necessarily led to market-based forms of organization in other industries. Hess and Kemerer [1994] analyzed mortgage markets, for example. They suggest that the EMH may need to be reframed because it does not clearly explain the lack of electronic market organization in the industry. With the the Internet, however, industry-wide efforts emerged to implement vertical XML-based IS standards to improve mortgage processing, data exchange and information transparency long the supply chain [Wigand et al., 2005] . Though one could argue that the industry is now more electronic market-like than when Hess and Kemerer examined it, on a relative basis the move to unbiased mortgage markets has not occurred to the extent that it has in air travel markets.
Alternative theories have emerged to explain these industry structure outcomes, which we label quasi-market theories. These theories suggest that IT also reduces coordination costs of rather hierarchical contractual arrangements, so relationships with a few suppliers may prevail. Clemons et al. [1993] proposed a move-to-the-middle hypothesis. They recognize that IT may not only impact the transaction costs of market coordination, but also the transaction costs of long-term business relationships, such as monitoring product quality or safeguarding relationship-specific investments. By reducing product complexity and asset specificity, IT reduces the transaction costs of long-term relationships, so buyers may prefer explicit coordination with a few suppliers over the purchase of supplies in the spot market. 2 Wang and Seidman [1995] suggest that, due to negative externalities, it may be optimal for fewer suppliers to join an electronic data interchange system. More recently, Kauffman and Mohtadi [2004] proposed a risk-augmented transaction cost theory that is aimed at explaining the market structure effects of demand and supply shocks, such as sudden inventory buildup due to a recession or the loss of a key supplier. They showed that the possibility of shocks impacting large buyers' procurement may lead them to safeguard their profits through vertical or biased relationships, rather than pursuing trade in a market setting.
Moreover, the EMH has not effectively explained the fall in the number of suppliers that occurred in the auto industry in the 1990s [Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991] . Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1993] proposed an interpretation based on the theory of incomplete contracts, which posits that not all desired aspects of a trading relationship are contractible. So buyers may limit the number of suppliers to maintain supplier incentives to make non-contractible investments such as quality, responsiveness, and innovation. Hence, the equilibrium number of suppliers may decrease in the presence of IT.
Summary
With the advent of e-commerce technologies and the Internet, we have observed the emergence of new markets and the proliferation of existing ones.
Theoretically, this phenomenon can be partially explained with the EMH, which suggests that IT will reduce coordination costs across firms, leading to proportionally higher market-based forms of economic activity. On the other hand, quasi-market theories help explain why biased markets may prevail. When subject to transaction risks such as opportunism, asset-specific sunk costs, and market uncertainties, buyers are held hostage by sellers in the form of biased electronic markets and explicit relationships with a few suppliers. However, by reducing product complexity and asset specificity, IT decreases buyers' vulnerability to these transaction risks, which reduces the viability of biased markets.
This transaction cost-based rationale helps to explain how IT reduces buyer incentives for explicit relationships with one or a few suppliers. However, it does not explain how or why IT may lead sellers to forego the advantages of locking in buyers through long-term agreements. Sellers have a structural incentive to bias markets and distort or conceal information in their favor. So there is a need to develop theory to understand how and why IT leads sellers to increasingly favor transparent electronic markets.
We contribute to the unification and enhancement of prior theory by analyzing the air travel industry and the financial securities industry, which are representative of IT-enabled market transformations in recent years. We leverage our analysis with market design theory, which offers a foundation to categorize the choices that sellers make which may affect market structure. In particular, this theoretical perspective examines different types of selling mechanisms and the conditions under which sellers will select one type over another. Before presenting our analysis of these industries, we provide a review of different market design choices and how they are influenced by IT advances.
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF MARKET STRUCTURE
In competitive markets an exogenous mechanism selects prices that establish equilibrium between supply and demand. The related theory-market design theory or market microstructure theory-attempts to illuminate this "black box" by taking an alternative view [Madhavan, 2000] . Market microstructure is defined as the set of market participants, institutions and mechanisms that enable trade. It emphasizes that firms make explicit decisions to select trading prices and coordinate transactions that support exchange. Spulber [1999, p. 7] states that "[f]irms create and operate markets: setting prices, carrying out transactions, producing and distributing information, and forming and monitoring contracts." Equilibrium outcomes are aggregate results of the individual firms' actions, including choices affecting market microstructure.
The theory of market design focuses on the economic consequences of a trading mechanism's design. It has been extensively applied in the context of financial markets to understand how electronic trading influences liquidity, efficiency, and the distribution of wealth [Clemons and Weber, 1990; Schwartz, 1995] , and there is a growing body of literature on the design of electronic markets, grounded on auction theory [Anandalingam et al., 2005] .
IT, Electronic Markets, and Market Design
Firms use IT to design the informational features of their selling mechanisms and to automate them. (See Table 1 .) The degree of automation of a trading mechanism is determined by transaction efficiency and its temporal and geographical characteristics [Schwartz, 1995] . For example, Internet-based electronic markets enable efficient around-the-clock trading across national boundaries. In addition, automation allows sellers and buyers to trade without the intervention of intermediaries. Informational features of market design include market transparency, price discovery, and trading protocols. We now discuss in more depth how IT influences these informational features in the context of electronic trading.
Market transparency specifies the extent to which information is made available to market participants, including pricing, product, and supplier information [Granados et al., 2005] . Market transparency is negatively affected by sellers' decisions to bias, conceal, or distort information. A biased market is defined as a market where product and price information from all sellers is not presented equitably. A market that displays only prices but lacks information about product characteristics is not fully transparent because information is incomplete. On the other hand, a market that distorts information is not fully transparent because the information is inaccurate. Incomplete or distorted information may be driven by intentional market designs of sellers, or by technological imperatives that limit the quality and quantity of information that can be made available. We define opaque markets as those where information is E-commerce technologies increase the potential for market transparency. In turn, sellers strategically decide whether to capitalize on this potential in two ways. First, they can make choices regarding the information to be disclosed to buyers through their market mechanism, such as their own Internet portal or an electronic exchange in which they have decision-making power. Second, they can make strategic decisions to trade in a market based on its information disclosure rules. Large market participants often avoid trading in electronic markets that require broad identity disclosure because it provides signals about their cost structure [Zhu, 2004] or their motivation to trade [Clemons and Weber, 1990; Madhavan, 2000] .
But buyers generally prefer market transparency. This is because they can better ascertain their product valuation and select the best product and supplier at the best price. Market transparency benefits buyers in three ways. (See Figure   1 .) First, search costs decrease as more information is made available at no additional cost. 
Figure 1. Contribution of Market Transparency to Buyer Surplus
Second, the value of a purchase increases if the consumer discerns product characteristics of existing alternatives with higher precision, resulting in more accurate product valuation [Hasbrouck, 1995] . In financial markets, for example, Internet brokerage firms are able to provide instantaneous and detailed information about a stock, which enables a more accurate valuation by the investor.
Third, information may become available that allows a consumer to transact at a lower price for a given product. Stigler [1961] showed that a lower price may result if search costs are reduced such that a lower market price is discovered.
However, there are some situations in which buyers may prefer less market transparency. For example, in business-to-business markets, high-demand buyers may express concerns about sharing too much information about the demand forecasts, lest an electronically linked supplier will exploit that information and turn prices against them [Kauffman and Mohtadi, 2005] Price discovery, the process by which market prices are established, i volumes [Madhavan, 2000] . In some markets, by obtaining details about the trading process, buyers and sellers are able to discover their reservation price For example, in financial markets transaction history provides clues about demand and supply pressures, which influence the prices at which buyers a sellers are willing to transact [Pagano and Roell, 1996] .
Auction theory is related to price discovery in electron 
III. WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS: AIR TRAVEL
The robustness of its ability to explain diff Together, these informational fea formance. However, there are trade-offs to be made, because changing a market's design in one dimension may affect it in another [Levecq and Weber, 2002] . In the market transparency dimension, suppliers and intermediaries are commonly faced with the trade-off between the benefits of a more transparent market to attract buyers and the losses that may be incurred by releasing privat information. Though market transparency increases demand by attracting buyers, it may put seller profit at risk due to better informed buyers [Porter, In the price discovery dimension, sellers face the decision to post fixed prices egotiate. While negotiation allows effective price discovery, there are information and negotiation costs that may deter buyers [Riley and Zeckha 1983] . There is also a trade-off between selecting a fixed price versus an auction mechanism. While an electronic auction may attract buyers through effective price discovery, it may also hurt seller revenues as buyers enjoy higher levels price transparency. Therefore, market design decisions that buyers, sellers, and intermediaries make depend on the evaluation of these trade-offs.
We contend that IT transforms these market design trade-offs, su g-term expected aggregate outcome of sellers' market design decisions will change. In the next section, we examine this process for air travel and financial securities, which have gone through significant IT-driven changes in the dimension of market transparency. Based on these mini-cases, we devel theoretical framework of the impact of IT on market structure.
AND FINANCIAL SECURITIES
a theoretical model is largely based on erent kinds of outcomes that are observed for a given phenomenon. We seek to explain the extent to which transparent electronic market mechanisms prevail across industries. Some industries make it to that point sooner, while others arrive later (and possibly not at all). Thus, since our goal is to develop an effective variance theory, we selected the air travel industry and the financi securities industries for our study, because they exhibit significant variation in degree of bias, accuracy, and completeness of market information. We observe that since the advent of the Internet, these industries have made strong moves towards higher market transparency, but the sources and extent of this transformation differ by industry sector.
In this section, we present two mini-cases of the market transformation of air (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) electronic markets. In this mini-case, we examine the forces that, together with Internet technology, have resulted in new market mechanism designs for the trade of financial securities. We focus on the differences that have emerged in the electronic trade of bonds and stocks, despite the fact that the emergence of Internet technology exerted simultaneous influence on both industries.
The Institutional M
The markets for fixed income securities in the Unite vince of a group of powerful investment banks that have exercised considerable market power. The result for private corporations and pub organizations that wish to issue bonds to obtain capital in the primary mark well as for investment management firms and individuals that wish to trade bonds in the secondary market, is that they have not been able to benefit from some of the efficiencies that are normally associated with the equities market. Equity markets vary in all design dimensions, namely market transparency, price discovery, and trading protocols [Levecq and Weber, 2002; Madhavan, 200 the market transparency dimension, designs vary in the time and extent of the During the 1990s, there were contentious public policy debates related to the "opaqueness" of the bond market [Bond Market Association, 1997b ]. Prices we difficult for investors to see because trade-related information was guarded by the market-making investment banks. They stalled the move to newer market designs that permit fuller market transparency. This practice is facilitated by the inherent diversity of bonds relative to equities. Firms with one or two issues of stock (common and preferred) may have numerous bond series, reflecting differen coupon rates and the maturity of the debt. Therefore, there may be millions of fixed income securities compared to a few thousand shares [Allen et al., 2001] .
During the 1990s, the impacts of new e-commerce technologies began to be , as trading and competition started outside of the traditional trading floors [Economides, 2001] . Prior to gaining authority as a primary issuer of bonds lik investment banks, commercial bank J. P. Morgan innovated with a dial-in screened-based bond issuance market for "vanilla debt" involving the mos known corporate names. [Phocuswright, 2003] . These are both significant amounts relative to the o cross-industry percent of retail sales through the Internet, which was short of 2%
[U.S. Census Bureau, 2004] . In this mini-case, we explore the accelerated ITdriven move to markets in the corporate and leisure air travel markets. compete effectively. CRS terminals were typically installed at travel agency locations based on long-term contractual sales agreements. Through these contracts, agencies were locked in to an airline or small set of airlines depen on the CRSs installed [Copeland and McKenney, 1998 ]. By 1983, 80% of tickets were sold by travel agencies through CRS terminals.
Due to the biased nature of CRS contracts between ncies, allegations emerged suggesting that automation of airline ticket distribution had resulted in an anti-competitive market environment. In June 1983, the government concurred and intervened, ordering CRSs to provide d on their flights and ticket prices to competitors, avoid discriminatory fees, and eliminate screen biases that favored the position of product offers for the airline owner or owners of a CRS.
While the level of bias dec laws, travel agencies still had the ability to conceal and distort information from consumers [Levine, 1987] . CRSs reduced product complexity for travel agencies, but travelers remained dependent on their relationship with the agencies to get the best travel offer at the best price. Globalization and ext of the functionality of these CRSs to include hotel and car reservations led to global distribution systems (GDSs), which allowed airlines and travel agencies further consolidate their competitive positions by offering complete and timely information to the traveler for air transportation, ground transport, and lodging. [PhocusWright, 2003] . Historically, brick-and-mortar trave have added value for business travelers by searching for the best prices and services. In addition, they aggregate demand for corporations to negotiate low prices and value-added service with airlines [Clemons and Row, 1991] ,
B2B
contributing to the segment of the industry known as managed business
Corporate travel customers typically have a need for special services.
quently, their plans change and they need timely attention to change th travel itineraries. In addition, travel itineraries are sometimes complex, involvin more than just a simple round trip between two cities. Therefore, the complexity of corporate travel needs is an opportunity for traditional travel agencies to provide service brokerage between airlines and corporations.
Rosenbluth Travel is a case in point [Clemons and Row, 199 vel developed an information system that consolidated travel offers from several major CRSs to provide value-added service to its corporate travel customers. The company gained competitive advantage by improving effic for its customers, through a wider variety of product offers tailored to specific customer needs. In addition, the system provided complete and accurate information about prices and alternative itineraries, both current and histor Soon competitors replicated this technological innovation, but at that point Rosenbluth travel had consolidated its position in the B2B travel agency se market worldwide.
Despite technolog sactions directly with airlines, travel agencies continue to perform an adde value role in the business segment of air travel. This may explain why transparent OTAs have successfully penetrated the leisure and unman business travel markets (see below), but they are just beginning to make inro in the managed business travel segment. In 2003, 20% of U.S. corporate travel was sold online, compared to 40% for the industry as a total. Due to the service requirements of business travelers, there may be a limit to the value that can be extracted from Internet-based reservation-making [Chircu and Kauffman, 2001 ].
Nevertheless, recently major OTAs have developed strategies to further penetrate the corporate travel business segment, and brick-and-mortar tr agencies such as Carlson Wagonlit Travel are being forced to respond with the own Internet-based market mechanisms that offer the lowest prices in the market [Reinan, 2004] . name-your-own-price mechanism that resembles a sealed-bid auction, wher consumers make a bid for a trip and only after purchase the airline and specific itinerary is revealed. Some OTAs were designed to be transparent, such as claiming that it was the most transparent OTA. Orbitz was designed with a sta of-the-art Web-based system to offer as many products as possible for a travel request. In addition, Orbitz developed preferred agreements with airlines and distributors that guaranteed their claim to give the lowest published fares anywhere [Salkever, 1999] . Soon other OTAs followed Orbitz's competitiv move for higher market transparency [Granados et al., 2005] . Expedia and Travelocity have retracted from their strategy to bias fare searches in favor o specific airlines, and Hotwire and Priceline.com added transparent mechanism to their opaque product offers. Nevertheless, after only two years, Orbitz was able to consolidate its position as a leader in the OTA market.
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IV. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS
In this section we p pares and contrasts the t the
PRELIMINARIES AND ASSUMPTIONS
alternatives and add complexity to a firm's evaluation of market design trade-offs. In the Internet environment, while erform a cross-case analysis that com degree to which B2C and B2B air travel and financial securities markets have become transparent, the influence of IT in this process, and its interaction with other relevant forces. We first provide some preliminaries, including some assumptions for our analysis. Then, we present a theoretical framework tha emerged from this analysis, and the related propositions. Finally, we discuss findings and the implications for IT strategy.
Advances in IT increase market design mini-case studies of the air travel and financial Internet markets suggest that market design options for market participants have multiplied, yet there is an increased preference for the use of transparent market mechanisms. In the following cross-case analysis, we will develop propositions to explain how buy and sellers favor transparent electronic markets in the presence of IT, despit explosion of market design options available. To make our analysis tractable and to set the boundary conditions for the application of our findings, we make the following assumptions:
• An industry is a closed economic system, so structural market outcomes are not influenced
• The impact of IT on firms' internal operations does not affect market structure. We will later relax this assumption and discuss
• The benefits of transparent electronic markets are evident for buyers buying firms or consumers).
• Sellers (i.e., suppliers or intermediaries) have the ability to design and implement their own market m existing electronic markets.
Sellers have incentives to maintain information advantages in the form have the choices to introduce bias and opaqueness, or to compete for buyers with market information. Therefore, a move to transparent markets can be viewed as a process by which the market design trade-offs of most sellers evol to favor and implement transparent market mechanisms.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ve
In the following analysis we show how markets with unbiased, complete, and ail despite the explosion of IT-driven market des ket .)
Notes e higher prod facilitated explanation. The driving forces in the move to transparent electronic markets are IT a rces lead s how the theory accurate information tend to prev ign options for sellers. We develop a theoretical framework of the move to transparent electronic markets by contrasting and comparing the status of mar structure in the financial securities and air travel industry sectors. (See Figure 2 : (1) Transparent e-markets are less dominant for bonds than stocks due to th uct complexity of bonds.
(2) Price competition in the travel industry has the move to transparent e-markets. However, differentiation strategies
Opaque or Biased Transparent Market Market Source of Difference

Product complexity
Competitive forces, product characteristics, and legal forces Ai possible in corporate travel markets have inhibited this move. Service-oriented corporate travel products make biased and opaque markets competitive, in part due to the non-digital nature of customer service.
(3) Travel agency distribution became transparent due to regulatory measures that curbed anti-competitive behavior.
Figure 2. Structure of the Air Travel and Financial Securities Markets
To characterize the key ideas up front, we offer the following brief nd forces that facilitate competition and electronic trade. These fo to markets with accurate, complete and unbiased market information. Next, we explain how these forces interact to favor transparent markets. (See Figure 3 .)
From Electronic Hierarchies to Electronic Markets (Link A)
The EMH suggests that IT facilitates the move to market-based electronic trading by diminishing market coordination costs. Figure 3 show innova ow cost and product differentiation strategies. We observe that in all industry sectors of lectronic hierarchies and markets relates to our theoretical framework.
Link A represents the impact of IT on the shift from electronic hierarchies to arkets, or the EMH. Although Link A represents the core focu we emphasize that Malone et al. [1987] also discussed and made predictions about t subsequent stages of market structure in the dimension of bias, reflecting the roles some of the other links in the figure. Link C shows the impact of IT on electronic product representation. Links B, D and E suggest that IT, electronic product representation, and competitive and institutional forces help together explain the variance in market transparency levels across industries.
Figure 3. Theoretical Framework on the Move to Transparent E-Markets -Driven Market Transparency (Link B)
First-movers will benefit most from proprietar petition is likely to follow. We observe this phenomenon in both air travel and financial securities, where new technologies have enabled competition fo customers with market information. Representative examples are Rosenbluth and Orbitz in air travel and Capitalink in the bond market. These firms took advantage of e-commerce technologies to increase their customer base by developing technologies to process and offer market information beyond common industry practices. This leads to our first proposition:
• Proposition 1 (The IT and Market Information Proposition): Se will deploy and develop IT to compete with market inform
The IT and Market Information Proposition suggests that firms will use IT to te with transparent market mechanisms, beyond the traditional l 
IT and Product Characteristics (Links C and D)
We define electronic product representation as the ability to describe a product through an electronic medium. The air travel and financial securit markets suggest that ITs that reduce product comp racteristics influence electronic product representation, which in turn has impact on sellers' market design choices. More generally, we contend that the higher the level of product compl less is the pressure that IT exerts on suppliers and intermediaries to adopt transparent market mechanisms. This is because firms ca vices to simplify product complexity for the buyer. representation. We contend that the along this continuum of product types, the more a product can be described digitally, the higher are the chances that transparent market mechanisms will prevail. Our rationale is two-fold, based our observations of the air travel and financial markets. First, the relative succes of OTAs was driven by the user-friendly and consistent display of product o from multiple airlines, including the itinerary, number of stopovers, and prices.
More generally, since transparent market mechanisms offer product options from multiple suppliers, they require more processing, flexible tailoring, and manipulation to provide equitable, accurate, and complete information. Digital product representation reduces these costs of information processing, so the cost reduction benefits are relatively higher for transparent electronic m with their own transparent mechanisms. More generally, the ease of representing products electronically makes it more difficult for sellers to distort or concea information, because there is competitive pressure from other players who can also provide this information at a low cost.
It follows that IT artifacts which enable digital representations of a product favor a move to transparent markets. CRS technology in the air travel industry translated the complex information on airline ncies could better translate this information to travelers. Later, this same technology was used by online travel agencies to develop user-friendly interfac for travelers to make their own purchases. On the other hand, the Internet allowed discount equity brokers to develop user-friendly representations of sto market information for individual investors. This leads to our second proposition:
• Proposition 2 (The IT and Electronic Product Representation Proposition): IT that enables effective electronic product representation favors a move to transparent electronic markets.
The IT and Electronic Product Representation Proposition suggests that, on a basis, industries where IT advances make it easier to elec repres arkets.
Ou ased ly higher l markets.
mmon to observe price com e ability to comp e and l l e g the choice of implementing an IT-enabled transparent me at ent a product will make a faster move to transparent electronic m r rationale is both transaction-cost based and revenue-based. Since transparent markets require more information processing capabilities than bi and opaque markets, if IT reduces product complexity or increases the ability to represent products electronically, the respective cost reduction is relative for transparent market mechanisms. On the other hand, IT that facilitates electronic product representation makes it difficult for a seller to distort or concea information. This is because there is competitive pressure from other sellers who can provide accurate and complete market information.
Competitive and Institutional Forces (Link E)
The air travel and finance industries provide evidence that competitive and institutional forces favor a move to transparent electronic Competitive Forces. In U.S. air travel, it is co petition among airlines since the deregulation of the industry, particularly in leisure markets which have been commoditized. In the absence of th ete effectively with differentiation strategies, competition by innovativ transparent OTAs has emerged successfully in the leisure segment. However, the competitive forces that favor transparent electronic mechanisms for leisure travel are mitigated in corporate travel due to its service-oriented nature. The market power that corporations obtain through consolidation of demand by trave agencies and the need for value-added services (e.g., handling complex trips and time-sensitive itinerary changes) reduces the pressure on corporate trave providers to compete with market information. Therefore, opportunities for product differentiation make biased and opaque market mechanisms viable in corporate travel.
In competitive environments, firms have an incentive to adopt innovative market designs as strategies for differentiation, rather than fuel losses from pric competition. Facin chanism or competing on price to attract buyers, many firms will prefer to compete for buyers with market information. Potential incremental benefits from a biased or opaque market mechanism will not offset the potential losses th price competition brings. In addition, implementing transparent market mechanisms increases pressure to eliminate price discrimination. For example, the Internet has allowed consolidation of international financial and air travel markets, diminishing the ability of firms to price-discriminate based on re and national borders [Economides, 2001; Reuters, 2004] .
In summary, competitive forces tend to make transparent market mechani more viable than biased and opaque ones. Sellers with market power may be in Institutional Forces. It follows that institutional forces that promote a competitive environment also favor a move to transparent markets. Some institutions explicitly lobby to prohibit marke sumer protection agencies, industry lobbying groups, and regulators prohibit predatory behavior by firms with market power. In the 1980s the a owners of GDSs gave preferential treatment to their own travel options in scr displays, so regulations were created to prohibit these practices of market bia Moreover, regulations were introduced that required owners of GDSs to share sales information with other airlines, allowing competitors to have complete and accurate information about each other's products, prices, and sales history.
Institutional forces that discourage anti-competitive behavior indirectly lead sellers to collectively support transparent electronic markets. In particular, in the presence of regulations that make explicit collusion illegal, sellers may prefer sparent electronic markets so they can tacitly collude and avoid losses from price competition [Varian, 1999; Campbell et al., 2005] . This theoretical impact of institutional forces that discourage explicit collusion has been observed in financial and air travel markets. Christie and Schultz [1995] found that traders tacitly colluded to avoid trading at the odd-eighth quotes, increasing the average spread. The study prompted an investigation by the Securities and Exchan
Commission, resulting in a $1 billion dollar settlement with investors to drop pending lawsuits. Similar competitive and legal forces may also explain why, despite the risk to their profits, major U.S. airlines reintermediated the Internet B2C air travel market with Orbitz, which provided transparency to the market beyond what had been observed so far. The aforementioned analysis leads to the following proposition: • Proposition 4 (Transparent Electronic Market Proposition): In competitive industries where products can be effectively repres electronically, IT will lead to the dominance of transparent electron markets. The absence of any of these factors inhibits the move to transparent electronic markets.
ed on the conditions stated in the Transparent Electronic Market ition, the theory of transparent electronic markets predicts the indu where the IT-driven dominance of transparent electronic markets will be erved. We contend that competition and product characteristics that f electronic trading are sufficient to tilt the trade-off between the benefits of biase or opaque market mechanisms and transparent market mechanisms in favor of the latter. Other industries with any of the conditions absent may still experienc a move to transparent markets, although at a lower pace or to a lesser extent than those where all conditions are present.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the findings from the cross-case analys e is and the implications for practitioners and researchers.
the Findings el industry [Granados et al., 2005] ore deeply, and to see what we could do to et al. [1987] , and where our unique contribution lies. The resulting propositions suggest that the move to transparent electronic markets is grounded on the use of IT in competitive stra ropositions argue that sellers will not only design market mechanisms to reduce tran tegy. All of our p saction costs, but also to strategize and compete against their rivals. We contend that it is this competitive pressure that, under certain conditions most firms to favor and implement transparent electronic markets.
Nevertheless, the propositions carry forward some elements of transaction cost-based perspectives of industrial organization. For example, the reduction in information processing costs due to declining product complexity fav [Garbade and Silber,1976; Picot et al., 1995; Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003] Schwartz, 1989] . We contend that in the Internet revolution most indus will experience a similar outcome. Sellers will continue to obtain benefits from market biases and opaqueness until they face competitive pressures and institutional forces that lead them to favor transparent electronic markets. [Malone et al., 1987] . For complex products, the development of standards for product description, transaction formats, and
].
lers and buyers, has been a key contributor. However, other factors w instrumental, such as the relative ease of product representation of leisure air travel and equities, and competitive and regulatory developments in these industries that pre-dated the Internet revolution. As these conditions appear in other industries, we expect to see a similar evolution towards more transparent markets.
In a market environment where a move to transparent markets is expected t occur, first movers will have a preemptive competitive advantage. Therefore, we propose th ilitate product representation and competitive forces to assess whether a specific industry is likely to experience a move towards higher levels of market transparency.
IT Strategy Implications for Implementing Transparency. Our analysis to t point has assumed that external forces dictate the organization of markets.
Putting that ass internal forces of the firm, external forces will continue to dictate the longterm outcomes. As the cost of IT investments decrease and the processing capabilities of computers increase, IT will allow firms to process data and generate more timely, more accurate, and more complete information. This w only accelerate the outcomes for market information predicted by our propositions.
Unbiased markets require the development of integrated or compatible databases and interoperable systems that make product and price info from all sellers data definitions is likely to facilitate higher structural levels of market transparency, and interfirm collaboration may be necessary [Wigand et al., 2005 Technologies that facilitate conversion of product characteristics into digital formats will enable market transparency in industries of complex and products.
As firms consider the implementation of transparent electronic market mechanisms, IT managers can play a key role to enable these market mechanism non-digital s. Industries such as air travel and financial securities have benefited from ich ystems rs to rent electronic markets to explain and predict the role of IT on market structure transformations. The approach that we have taken in this work is not the usual exa That ilding ers s, IT alone ional existing legacy systems such as electronic exchanges and CRSs, wh integrate information from most suppliers and make individual sellers' s interoperable. However, these systems typically have integrated architectures that make them very large and expensive. The Internet provides a powerful platform for IT strategists who are willing to break away from legacy system infrastructures to develop distributed, less expensive architectures that provide timely and accurate information without risking data integrity. Orbitz, for example, uses a distributed architecture with networked, low-cost Intel serve run web-based software that searches and prices travel itineraries.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new unified theoretical framework for transpa mple of theoretical development that we most often see in the literature.
often involves the use of multiple case studies as a means to identify the bu blocks for new theory. In this research, we have developed a theoretical framework that is based not only on case studies but also on the unification of numerous theoretical arguments and perspectives from the prior literature. Our theoretical framework is innovative and potentially valuable for IT practition and researchers because it explains market structure in terms of the informational characteristics of a market. The core rationale of the framework is compelling. Sellers have economic incentives to adopt biased and opaque market mechanisms. While IT enables transparent market mechanism will not eliminate these incentives. Our analysis of the financial securities and air travel markets suggests that a combination of IT, competitive forces, institut forces, and enhanced electronic product representation triggered the move to transparent electronic markets.
We have taken advantage of the advanced stage of air travel and financial markets to develop a theoretical framework about the impact of IT on market structure. We applied an inductive approach appropriate in case study me 2C bond 2C re ind e 0 , cross-country studies by industry can be done to examine the impact of diff roduct thodology [Eisenhardt, 1989] to examine the forces that play a role in the evolution of markets, towards high structural levels of market transparency. By analyzing multiple industry sectors within these settings (i.e., B2B and B and equities markets, B2B travel agency and corporate travel markets, and B leisure travel markets), we found that new IT-enabled informational strategies a being used to compete for buyers, which is creating structural changes in the level of bias, accuracy, and completeness of market information. In addition, we found that there are common forces that drive these changes in market structure.
Although the number of contexts that we have examined is not large, they nevertheless allowed the formulation of a set of propositions, in concert with the prior theoretical literature, which can be potentially applied to and tested in other ustry settings. Additional in-depth case studies can be performed to validate and enhance these propositions. For example, an interesting case is that of the book market, where Amazon.com has led the path to greater levels of market transparency. Amazon.com has included secondary markets in customers' search requests to reduce biases and enable price discovery, despite the risk to their profits. In addition, in 2003 it introduced a "Search Inside the Book" featur on its Web site that allows consumers to browse pages of more than 120,00 books, to effectively increase product transparency in the industry [Economist, 2004] .
With a larger dataset of industry cases, empirical analysis can be done to determine the impact of IT and other forces on market transparency. For example erent degrees of competitiveness and legal forces on market structure.
Similarly, cross-industry studies can be done to determine the impact of p characteristics on market transparency.
Finally, we propose additional theory-building efforts to examine the imp IT on other dimensions of market design. For example, although auction markets for used products have proliferated thank act of s to the Internet, they are not nec ducts essarily transparent. A buyer that engages in one auction commonly accepts the biased nature of this market mechanism, where other product offers are not considered. The success of Internet-based auction markets for used pro (e.g., www.ebay.com) suggests that the impact of IT on market structure should also be examined along other dimensions of market design, such as price discovery.
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